"Vielleicht ist die Musik das reinste Ausdrucksmittel für das Lebensgefühl, weil sie am stärksten von allem Gegenständlichen befreit ist (...) Metaphysiker sind Musiker ohne musikalische Fähigkeit. Dafür besitzen sie eine starke Neigung zum Arbeiten im Medium des Theoretischen, zum Verknüpfen von Begriffen und Gedanken."

Rudolf Carnap in "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache", Erkenntnis, 2, 1931/32

The Vienna Circle

Brief outline

The philosophy of the Vienna Circle is usually referred to as "Logical Empiricism" (see below for other designations). The main features may be characterized as follows:

1. Only empirical or logical judgments were accepted. In particular Kant's "synthetic judgments apriori" were denied. Any "transcendental" way to gain knowledge was questioned. This led to:
2. a vigorous denial of "metaphysics" - this term being understood in the broadest sense. Here not only the validity of the answers but the very meaning of most questions was questioned. Carnap coined the term "Scheinproblem" ("pseudo problem" or "virtual problem") for most of the classical philosophical problems.
3. According to the Vienna Circle, philosphy can not add to the actual and factual knowledge - this is the job of science (say, physics, chemistry or economics). The function of philosphy was restricted to a (linguistic or logical) analysis of the statements made by those scientists. And finally:
4. Philosophy was understood as a "scientific" (here "wissenschaftlich", not "naturwissenschaftlich") enterprise in having rational standards and being pursued by a "scientific community". E.g. the discussions inside the Vienna Circle led to a constant development and change of the positions. This needs to be contrasted with the rather common practice in philosophy that one person builds an all-embracing system.

History

Careful historians distinguish between four different phases in the history of the Vienna Circle. I follow Koppelberg (1987):

1. 1907-1914: Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn and Otto Neurath meet for the discussion of scientific and philosophical topics. This is the so-called first Vienna Circle. Here a systematic (and also historical) study of science under the influence of Mach, Poincare and Duhem is pursued. This group develops a "conventionalistic empiricism" (Koppelberg 1987, p.50).


2. 1918-1924: discusion round under the informal direction of Hans Hahn. The mathematician Hahn (by the way the supervisor of kurt Gödels PhD in 1930) brings foundational questions of mathematics and logic into the focus. Wittgenstein's publication of the Tractatus logico philosophicus falls into this time (1921). In 1922 he uses his influence to support Schlick's appointment to the chair of "Philosophie der induktiven Wissenschaften".


3. 1924-1928: so-called non-public phase of the Vienna Circle. Regular thursday meetings under the direction of Moritz Schlick. Selected members meet also with Ludwig Wittgenstein


4. 1928-1938: so-called public phase of the Vienna Circle. Starting from the foundation of the "Verein Ernst Mach" and the publication of the manifest "Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis" (1929). The later coins also the name. Since 1926 Rudolf Carnap lectures in Vienna (in 1935 he was appointed professor in Prague). Carnap is strongly influenced by Frege, Russel and Wittgenstein. After the murderer of Schlick in 1936 the circle suffers a tragic loss. Until 1938 the circle continues some activity under the direction of Waisman before it finally dissolves.

Logical Positivism vs. Logical Empiricism

The philosophy of the Vienna circle goes by many names: neo positivism, logical empirism (or empiricism?), neo empirism, logical positivism etc.pp. Evidently it had something to do with empiricism/positivism but was "newer" and "more logical".

The labeling is certainly only insofar important as it actually helps to see the roots and the goals of the enterprise. In the Anglo-Saxon countries the name "Logical Positivism" is widespread since in 1931 Blumberg and Feigl made the philosophy known under this heading (Koppelberg 1987, p.311). However, past 1931 this name was more and more abandoned by the members of the circle in favor of "Logischer Empirismus". Koppelberg (1987, p. 311) quotes from a letter by Neurath (to Carnap):

"Bitte nicht "Positivismus" sagen. Ich las wieder mal Comtes Werk. Und obgleich ich es gegen zu viel Beschimpfung schützen muss, es graust einen oft...Ich werde ihn bei "Einheitswissenschaft" schon nennen - aber "Positivismus"...oh weh." Den Haag, 9th of May 1934

Interestingly the name "logical empiricism" can be used to illustrate a tension within the circle regarding the emphasis of their work. Roughly, Neurath is the one who puts the emphasis on "empiricism" while Carnap on the "logical".

"Du legst das Hauptgewicht auf Empirismus der Hahn-Neurath-Frank Gruppe; ich würde es mehr auf die logischen Probleme legen, die im Anschluss an Russel und Wittgenstein diskutiert wurden. Empiristische Leute gab und gibt es viele; für den Wiener Kreis ist die logische Analyse hauptsächlich charakteristisch." (Carnap to Neurath, Prague 15th of May 1935, quoted from Koppelberg 1987, p.53)

"Ein trefflicher logischer Ausschnitt ist Dir so wertvoll, dass du hundert Sünden gegen den Empirismus zu verzeihen bereit bist." (Neurath to Carnap, The Hague 14th of March 1935, quoted from Koppelberg 1987, p.53)

The Meaning Criteria

Appraisal

References

Other internet resources